Russell’s Theory of Descriptions can be best understood as a

Russells Theory of Descriptions finish be best soundless(prenominal) as a response to the shortcomings in Freges philosophy. He sought a possible action of language which, firstly, would avoid utilise or relying on every Fregean concept of Sinn and, secondly, would solve the paradox of existence in a way that allowed the truth-value to be goaded for all condemns without committing us to the existence of any reference less constituents.

Central to both Frege and Russells approach to language was the tenet that the app arnt grammatical blueprint of a fate bunghole mislead us round the hidden logical form of the proposition the sentence expresses. For Russell maven of the key distinctions that Frege failed to capture in attempting to logically analyze ordinary language was that amid logically proper pee-pees and interpretations. Russell believes that many of the terms that Frege had considered to be appoints were non in fact logically such, barely were quite an sorts of truncated descriptions. Russell argues that the con noneing of a logically proper summons is the exclusive thing it designates. A logically proper name is gistless unless there is some single object for which it stands. In the majority of cases, however, Russell believes that phrases of the posterior are in fact descriptions.

(With count on to descriptions he makes a further distinction, namely: An indefinite description is a phrase of the form a so-and-so and a definite description is a phrase of the form the so-and-so (in the singular). Russells Theory of Descriptions deals with the former, and henceforth I shall refer to them as descriptions simpliciter.) A description is recognized by its form, and non whether there is a definite individual so describe. Russell defines it in impedance to a name, and gives the avocation differences: + A description is a conglomerate symbol. A name is a simple symbol.

+ The meaning of a description is fixed and determinate when the meanings of its terms check already been fixed, i.e. you would understand the meaning [of it] if you had never perceive it before. In contrast, you would non understand the meaning of a name if you had never heard the record before beca role to know the meaning of a name is to know what it is applied to.         Russells analysis allows that traditionally sturdy sentences can be solved by rewriting them in a logically appropriate grammatical form. Let us reconsider the example of S: The baron of France is sapiential. According to Russell, anyone who asseverate S would, in fact, be logically asserting the following three propositions:         At least one person is the mightiness of France.

At most one person is the King of France.

Whoever is the King of France is wise.

In other words, while D: The King of France is the grammatical payoff of S it is non the logical subject. Frege overlooks this distinction. D is not a logically proper name that stands in a subject- promulgate relationship with wise. In fact, logically speaking, S is not a subject-predicate sentence at all, but a knotty kind of existential proposition, part of which might be described as a uniquely existential proposition. Since S is a conjunction of three propositions it follows that if one of them is infatuated, then S is false. olibanum Russell demonstrates how the truth-value of S can be determined without necessarily positing any existing object denoted by D.

As I nourish portrayed it thus far, Russell seems to have been quite successful in presenting a solution to the basic problems of identity and reference sketch at the beginning of this essay, while avoiding the problems and shortcomings created by the basic Fregean theory of objective scent out and truth-value-determining-reference.

I wish to conclude by briefly examining the well-known critique of Russell offered by Strawson. According to Strawson, Russell recognizes all two ways in which sentences which appear from their grammatical organise to be slightly some concomitant thing can be momentous. The first is that their grammatical form should be cheapjack as to their logical form, and that they should be analyzable, like S, as a special kind of existential sentence. The second is that their grammatical subject should be a logically proper name, of which the meaning is the individual thing it designates.

In contrast Strawson denies that an expression roled in the uniquely referring sense (e.g. a singular subject predicate sentence) falls into either of the two classes. He contends that there are no logically proper names and no descriptions in the Russellian sense. To support this claim Strawson introduces certain distinctions that he thinks Russell incorrectly overlooked.

Firstly, he distinguishes between an expression used in the uniquely referring sense and a sentence beginning with such an expression. Henceforth I shall term both respectively expression and sentence simpliciter. Secondly, he distinguishes: (A1) a sentence (A2) a use of a sentence (A3) an utterance of a sentence (A1) refers to the sentence itself, for example S: The King of France is wise, which can be uttered on various occasions by various speakers. There are, however, perspicuous differences between the occasions of the use of this sentence S. If two manpower uttered S, one in the reign of Louis XV and one in the reign of Louis XIV, each made a diametrical use out or the same sentence.

Thus (A2) refers to the particular use of a sentence.

Finally, (A3) refers to the different individual utterances of S which make the same use of it, for example two men in the reign of Louis XV simultaneously uttering S.

In these terms, Strawson identifies the root of Russells mistake in his failure to distinguish (A1) from (A2).



For Strawson meaning is a function of the sentence (A1), whereas mentioning and referring and truth and falsity [12] are functions of the use of the sentence (A2). Thus to talk about the meaning of a sentence is not the same as talking about its particular use on particular occasion, but about the rules, habits, conventions governing its correct use, on all occasions, to refer or to assert. In the case of the sentence S: The King of France is wise, Russells problem was to explain how the utterance of a sentence that contains a non-existent term can nevertheless say something and have a truth-value. Strawsons answer is to employ his distinction between meaning and mentioning, (A1) and (A2). In other words, the thing I mean when I use an expression is quite different from the meaning of the expression I use to talk of it. [14] An example is the word this. If someone asks me its meaning I do not point out or hand them everything which the word mentions or to which it refers. Instead I explain the general rules which govern its uses in particular utterances. What is important to obtain, Strawson argues, is that the significance of this sentence is independent of the potentiality truth-value of a particular use of it. It is Russells failure to grasp this that leads to the troublesome mythology of the logically proper name. Stawson denies the validity of Russells logical reduction. He disagrees that the utterance of S logically implies the existence of D: The King of France, and he argues that when we respond to such an utterance by saying There is no King of France we cannot be state to be directly contradicting S. Rather, according to Strawson, we are giving a reason for saying that the question of whether it is true or false simply does not arise. In other words, to begin a sentence with the expression the so-and-so implies (in the sense of signalling) that the existential conditions (described by Russell) of the particular individual mentioned are fulfilled but it does not state that they are. Russell fails, in Strawsons opinion, to make this subtle but necessary distinction between a disguised asseveration and a mere signal.

Once again we return to Strawsons central point: that just because a sentence is significant does not mean that any particular use of it must have a truth-value. This is close to Freges position, but intimately more sophisticated because it is not based on the existent identification of the truth-value as the references of sentences, but rather on the diligent distinction between a sentence as type, its use and its utterance. If a sentence qua sentence is significant that just substance it could be used, in certain circumstances, to say something true or false. It need not necessarily always be so used.

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